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Abstract. Cipher design is a multi-faceted process. Many designers fo-
cus on security, or present novel designs, but neglect to consider the
impact on their ciphers’ efficiency. This paper presents simple guidelines
for ensuring efficient symmetric cipher implementations on the Intel Pen-
tium 4 and associated architectures. The paper examines the suitability
of a handful of ECRYPT eSTREAM ciphers for the platform, including
Dragon, HC-256, MAG, Mir-1, Phelix, and Py.
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1 Introduction
The days of slow symmetric ciphers are over. It is widely considered that effi-
ciency of ciphers is nearly as important as their security. The benchmark set in
software by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [4] is around fifteen cycles
per byte on the Intel Pentium 4 [13]. Symmetric ciphers that do not equal or
surpass this benchmark are widely regarded as non-competitive 1. Word-based
stream ciphers are, in many cases ([1], [3], [18]), notably faster than block ciphers,
while not demonstrably less secure.
In 2005, the ECRYPT NoE eSTREAM stream cipher project released a call
[5] for stream cipher primitives. Of the thirty-five candidates, twenty-two were
profiled as suitable for software implementation, with efficiencies ranging from
three cycles [1] through to a sluggish 1,400 cycles per byte [11]. The diversity of
results reveals that many cipher designers do not understand either the need for
efficiency, or how to achieve it in their ciphers.
This paper discusses the design of ciphers with respect to the Intel Pentium
4. As this architecture is backwards compatible with the entire Intel x86 line,
most of the advice holds for the other members of the Pentium family, such as
 This work was partially funded by Australian Research Council Discovery Project
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1 For example, in the second round of the ECRYPT eSTREAM project, stream ciphers
that did not compete with the block cipher AES were “archived” [6].
the Pentium III. It also holds for the Pentium-D, which contains two Pentium 4
Prescott chips in a single package. Much of the advice is, at a high level, similar
to that found in the paper of Schneier and Whiting [15], published nearly a
decade earlier. This is a natural consequence of Intel’s strategy of backwards
compatibility in the Pentium line of processors.
The guidelines within this paper are prioritized as High, Medium or Low
according to their impact. They are presented at an algorithmic rather than
implementation level. It is easy to obtain an efficient implementation of a cipher
that has been well designed. Conversely, it may prove to be impossible to derive
a fast implementation if attention is not paid to efficiency during the cipher’s
design phase. The designer of a cipher and its optimizer are frequently differ-
ent people. This paper is presented to help the designer to understand how to
facilitate the job of the optimizer. For a good discussion about efficient imple-
mentation of ciphers on recent architectures, see [13].
Section 2 describes how to commence the task of cipher design with imple-
mentation considerations in mind. Sections 3 and 4 respectively describe the
impact that the number of cipher variables and state size have on the cipher’s
speed. Section 5 shows how to choose cipher operations for maximum speed.
Section 6 describes how special features of the Intel Pentium 4 may be useful in
implementing ciphers. Section 7 contains a discussion and summary of results.
2 Grounding Cipher Design in Reality
Many cipher designers hold the misconception that they can derive an accurate
estimate of their cipher’s efficiency by counting the number of its operations. This
belief is reinforced by the prediction of Schneier and Whiting [15] in 1997 that
all personal computing processors were converging rapidly to a RISC (Reduced
Instruction Set Computing) architecture. History has shown this trend to be
mythical. The Pentium 4 architecture is very complex, and this way of obtaining
a benchmark on the cipher is inaccurate.
Consider the MAG cipher specification [16], which computes the relative ef-
ficiency of that cipher to RC4 by counting the number of operations in their
update functions. It is concluded there, without the support of empirical evi-
dence, that 32-bit MAG is four times faster than 8-bit RC4, due to the number
and nature of their respective operations. The results given in Section 7 show
that a basic implementation of MAG is more than four times slower than a basic
implementation of RC4. Similar counting strategies are employed for HERMES
[12], the estimate of which is at least qualified by specifying an 8-bit RISC ar-
chitecture, and for MIR-1 [14], which also mistakenly assumes a lower bound
of one operation per clock. Counting operations is not an effective method for
calculating cipher efficiency.
Guideline 1 (High) Run practical tests during the design process to gauge
the efficiency of the cipher.
A corollary to this is “don’t make up concrete timing information based
upon your paper design”. The reality of a cipher’s efficiency is connected not
just with the contained operations, but also with how well its design is matched
to the target architecture. This means that the performance of a cipher will vary
even between variants of a processor (for example, the Willamette, Northwood
and Prescott variants of the Intel Pentium 4).
For example, MUGI [17] looks simple on paper: it uses an Linear Feedback
Shift Register (LFSR), s-boxes, byte swapping, and simple arithmetic operations.
However, it runs slowly on the Pentium 4, at around 25 cycles/byte [8], being a
64-bit cipher implemented on a 32-bit platform. The simple operation counting
outlined above does not determine the impact of this design-architecture mis-
match. The story is similar for 64-bit MIR-1 [14]. The second guideline not only
leads to a better approximation of the performance of the cipher, but also to a
more efficient cipher.
Guideline 2 (High) Understand (in general terms) the architectures on which
the cipher is likely to be implemented.
By paying attention to the Intel register set, how data is transferred be-
tween the registers and memory, and how it is processed by the CPU, the cipher
designer can learn how to make a more efficient cipher. The designer can also
manipulate architecture-specific features to this end.
Fig. 1. Intel Pentium 4 Architecture
3 The Pentium 4’s Register Set
Registers are very fast memory locations on the CPU die that operate at clock
speed, rather than the slower speeds of general-purpose memory. Ideally, each
variable in the cipher algorithm can be mapped directly to a register, rather
than to general-purpose memory. The Intel Pentium 4 is register-poor in that
the programmer has direct access to only eight 32-bit general purpose registers,
shown at the right of Figure 1.
Not all registers are treated equally: for example, the multiplication instruc-
tion MUL works exclusively upon the EAX and EDX registers; common string
operations operate on ESI and EDI; and stack-based operations relating to pro-
cedure calls and local variables use EBP and ESP. This reduces the availability
of these registers without precluding their use. The instructions that operate on
these eight registers, and the rules for dealing with them are found in [9].
Most members of the the Pentium family sport additional registers that can
also be used by the programmer. The Multimedia Extensions (MMX) duplex a
series of eight 64-bit registers on the back of the Floating Processor Unit (FPU).
Members of the family from Intel Pentium III onwards contain eight independent
128-bit (XMM) registers as part of the Streaming Extensions (SSE). The MMX
and XMM registers are controlled by their own sets of specialized (and in most
regards, limited) instructions. So there are three sets of registers, and three sets
of mostly incompatible instructions.
Register pressure occurs when, at a given time, there are more cipher variables
to deal with, than there are registers in which to store them. In this case, some
of the registers need to be stored in slower memory. This is likely to have a
negative impact on the performance of the cipher.
Guideline 3 (Medium) For optimal efficiency, the number of variables in any
locality of the cipher algorithm should not exceed the number of usable registers.
A good example of adherence to this guideline can be seen in the stream ci-
pher Phelix [18]. Its designers chose to use a 160-bit internal state in their cipher,
because this directly maps to five 32-bit registers, meaning that the state does
not need to be stored in slower memory. In Mir-1, register pressure is generated
through the use of the four sixty-four bit variables in its loop update state func-
tion. These variables translate into eight thirty-two bit variables xti, 0 ≤ i < 8.
Because each updated variable xt+1i depends upon all x
t
i, eight additional reg-
isters are required. Ignoring the intermediates, this results in a demand for ten
registers at any time. This problem is insoluble using just the general purpose
registers.
4 Transferring Data
The Pentium 4’s registers are accessible at clock speed (between 1.3 GHz and
3.8 GHz). The memory from which the registers acquire their data is up to three
times slower, and there is a latency penalty of as much 75 cycles, depending upon
the chip variant, the front side bus, and how the data transfer is managed. The
Pentium 4 contains mechanisms to reduce memory bottlenecks, one of which is a
series of high-speed caches positioned between the CPU and the main memory.
Data is summoned, on demand, to the caches from the main memory. When the
data is required by the CPU, but not available within the registers or the caches,
then a efficiency penalty (hidden to the cipher designer) is incurred.
The Pentium 4 generally has two caches: the first, the L1 cache, operates
at clock speed. In the Willamette and Northwood, the L1 cache has a data
capacity of eight kilobytes. In the Prescott, this capacity is increased to sixteen
kilobytes. The L2 cache has a shared code and data capacity of between 256 and
2,048 kilobytes. There is L1 cache access latency of between two and four cycles,
which increases to as much as sixteen cycles for the Willamette/Northwood’s L2
cache (twenty-three cycles for the Prescott). These latencies are incurred if the
data is not present in the registers, and has to be summoned from the cache.
The L1 cache stores up to 12,000 micro-operations (µops), which are decom-
posed assembly code instructions. Most instructions are converted into between
one and four µops. Programs which contain more than 12,000 µops are partially
stored in the L2 cache or memory. While manipulating the caches is the task
of the implementer rather than that of the cipher designer, there is a simple
guideline that the designer can use to benefit the implementer.
Guideline 4 (Medium) Design the cipher so that both its code and the state
fit within the L1 cache.
This guideline is ranked as Medium, because a cipher that does not fit within
the L1 cache is still shielded from the effects of slow memory by the much
larger L2 cache. Phelix [18] adheres to this guideline, with its 160-bit state
and small code size easily fitting into the Northwood’s L1 cache. The block ci-
pher LOKI97 [2] uses two s-boxes, one 13 × 8 and the other 11 × 8. Together
this amounts to ten kilobytes of memory, and the s-boxes will not fit into the
Willamette/Northwood’s L1 cache. The tabular form of the AES also causes
pressure in the L1 cache, as noted by its degraded performance [20].
One of the more interesting examples in this regard is Py [1]. It is one of the
fastest ECRYPT ciphers on the Pentium III, with a throughput of one byte for
each 2.8 cycles. Py uses two large tables. Elements in each table are modified
using elements from both tables. The “novelty” of Py is the rolling array, which
uses an old optimization trick commonly applied to LFSRs.
The traditional way to represent a LFSR with l stages is to use a circular
buffer B of size m = l. A pointer p,B ≤ p < B + m indicates the location of
stage W0. The element W1 is located at p+1 if p+1 < l otherwise at location B.
When the LFSR clocks, the feedback is written into the LFSR (usually at W0),
and the pointer increments by one. No elements are moved, or changed, except
for where the feedback is placed. At each step, the pointer has to be checked to
see if p equals B + m, in which case it is set to B. Any access into the LFSR
also need to be bound checked.
Py’s designers reason that the check on p is an expensive overhead. Py mit-
igates this expense by trading off memory. The trick it uses to allocate a buffer
that is much larger than the LFSR, that is, m  l. As time passes, the pointer
p moves along this buffer, and the feedback element normally written at W0 is
instead written at Wl. When the pointer reaches the end of the buffer, all of the
elements representing the LFSR, from B+m−(l+1) to B+m−1 are physically
copied back to B through to B+ l. The bound check on p needs to be made once
in (m/|W |) words of outputs, where |W | is the size of the output word. This
strategy can be adapted to any cipher in which the feedback is written only to
the contiguous positions at the start of the LFSR. The copy operation employed
by Py is expensive, but the cost is amortized over all of the intervening opera-
tions. Thus Py is at its most effective when the size of the buffer approaches the
size of the L1 cache.
The default size for the buffers in the Py code submitted to ECRYPT is
b = 4000 stages, where each stage is 32 bits. There are two buffers, so the state
size is 32 kilobytes, which is commensurate with the size of the Pentium III’s
L1 cache. Clearly the cipher is less efficient on the Pentium 4, since the copy
operation needs to be called four times more frequently to accommodate the
much smaller size of that machine’s L1 data cache. Benchmarks for Py with
varying buffer sizes are given in Table 1 in Section 7.
5 Processing Data
From the cache, the data moves to the CPU. The cipher designer needs to
understand how the data is processed, and from there choose instructions that
optimize that processing.
5.1 The Pentium 4’s Execution Engine
The CPU operates on data summoned to the registers, using its three-phase
execution engine. The first phase, the Instruction Front-End converts assembly
instructions into µops and supplies them in the order provided through the
instruction portion of the L1 cache to the Instruction Execution core.
In theory, the super-scalar Instruction Execution core is able to execute six
µops (for example, six exclusive-ors) within a single clock-cycle. It re-orders the
instructions provided by the Instruction Front-End to provide the fastest possible
execution, withstanding dependencies between the operands. The core has four
ports that provide access to its execution units, including
1. port #0 has a fast integer unit and a MMX/SSE move unit2. The port can
dispatch two fast integer operations per cycle; or one fast integer operation
and one MMX/SSE move or store operation. Fast integer operations include
logical operations, addition, subtraction and exclusive-or.
2 Floating point operations are ignored in this discussion, since floating point arith-
metic rarely features in symmetric cipher design
2. port #1 has a fast integer unit, and a normal integer unit. The port can
dispatch two fast integer operations per cycle. An integer multiply, shift or
rotate, or MMX/SSE operation can be substituted for the second fast integer
operation.
3. port #2 deals with fetching memory for the general purpose registers. It can
deal with one operation per cycle.
4. port #3 deals with storing data to memory. It can deal with one operation
per cycle.
When the execution units have processed the µops, the third phase of the
execution engine, the Instruction Retirement Unit, takes them and retires them
in the correct order to maintain program correctness. Although the instruction
core can execute six µops in parallel, the instruction retirement unit retires three
µops in one clock cycle. This is the upper bound on the CPU throughput.
Guideline 5 (Medium) To take advantage of the Pentium 4’s super-scalar
ability, ensure that all instruction ports are occupied at all times for optimal
execution.
There are some mechanisms within the Pentium 4 architecture, such as reg-
ister renaming, which work to maximize the efficiency of the core (which is why
this guideline has a medium priority). But the cipher designer needs to consider
the types and order of operations used within a cipher. For example, if the cipher
design requires two parallel executions of a multiplication, they will be executed
serially as only port #1 handles general-purpose multiplication. Alternatively, if
the cipher design requires parallel execution of a multiplication and an addition,
the operations can be shunted to ports #1 and #0 respectively for simultaneous
execution.
5.2 Throughtputs and Latencies
Each instruction is associated with a latency and a throughput. The latency
of the instruction is the delay incurred before the CPU can operate on the
next dependent instruction. For example, the latency affects the timing of the
instruction sequence a = a ⊕ b; a = a  c. The throughput is the delay before
an independent operation can be scheduled on the same execution unit. For
example, throughput affects the timing of a = a⊕ b; c = c⊕ d.
On the Intel Pentium 4, fast integer operations such as 32-bit addition,
subtraction, exclusive-or and logical operations such as AND and OR all have
throughputs and latencies of 12 cycle (except on the Prescott, where these op-
erations have latencies of one cycle). Two of these 12 cycle operations can be
scheduled and completed on a fast integer port within each clock cycle (assum-
ing that their operands are dependency-free and located within the registers).
As there are two fast integer ports, this means that up to four fast operations
can be processed within the execution unit per cycle! This is a peak rate, and
is subject to the limiting factor of three operations per cycle on the Instruction
Retirement unit.
Shifts and rotates are executed on the normal integer unit, and on the
Willamette/Northwood, have a worst-case latency of four cycles. On the same
platforms, multiplication has a worst case throughput on five cycles, and latency
of up to eighteen cycles. Timings for all operations can be found in [10].
Many 32-bit compilers offer decent support for 64-bit operands, and trans-
late simple 64-bit arithmetic and logical operations into the underlying 32-bit
instruction codes quite efficiently. A sixty-four bit exclusive-or can be simulated
using two thirty-bit exclusive-ors. A sixty-four bit addition can be simulated
using two thirty-bit additions, a comparison, and possibly an additional carry.
Sixty-four bit rotation can be simulated using four thirty-two bit shifts and two
exclusive-ors. On a per-bit basis, none of these operations is much worse than
on 32-bit operands.
Mir-1’s loop state update sub-function updates four sixty-four bit variables
using the simple operations of addition, shifting, AND, OR, and multiplication.
A sixty-four bit multiplication can be simulated on thirty-two registers using
four multiplications, and eight additions. Considering the dependencies between
operations, the four multiplications in loop state update, responsible in the pro-
duction of one eight byte keystream word, expend as much as one hundred and
twelve clock cycles!
Guideline 6 (High) Choose operations with low latency and low throughput.
Avoid expensive operations such as multiplication or division, unless necessary.
The fastest ECRYPT ciphers on this platform (HC-256 [19], Phelix [18], and
Py [1]) adhere to this guideline and also do not make extensive use of s-boxes
or table-lookups. Unlike other cipher primitives, s-boxes do not take single or
fractional clock cycles. For example, a single 8 × 8 s-box lookup y = S(x) on a
32-bit machine may take up to three operations, as shown in Figure 2.
movzx eax, DWORD PTR _x$[ebx] ; copy source to index register
mov ecx, DWORD PTR _sbox[eax*4] ; copy address of s-box
mov DWORD PTR _y$[ebx], ecx ; perform s-box lookup
Fig. 2. Assembly Code for 8× 8 S-box Lookup
Because of the dependencies between them, these operations all occur in se-
rial. Register pressure prevents complete parallelization of more than two neigh-
bouring s-box lookups. Additionally, the cache issues demonstrated in Section 4
come into play.
Guideline 7 (Medium) S-boxes are large and slow. Use with caution.
This guideline has a Medium priority because the s-box provides a poten-
tially rich source of non-linearity. Many ciphers, including HERMES [12], use
8× 8 s-boxes, whereas Dragon [3] uses 32× 32 s-boxes. The use of larger s-boxes
improves their non-linearity, but also poses a practical problem: whereas 8 × 8
s-boxes require 256 bytes of storage, 32× 32 s-boxes require sixteen gigabytes.
This is clearly not practical, so in Dragon a virtual s-box is constructed as
y = S0(x0) ⊕ S1(x1) ⊕ S2(x2) ⊕ S3(x3) where x = x0‖x1‖x2‖x3. The memory
requirement of the virtual s-box is further reduced to two kilobytes by reusing
one of the 8 × 32 s-boxes, avoiding a likely L1 cache overflow. Performing a
lookup on Dragon’s virtual 32× 32 s-box consists of four 8× 32 s-box lookups,
isolating individual bytes in the source word, using three ANDs and three shifts,
and combining the results using three exclusive-ors. Four index registers are
required for a single 8 × 32 s-box. As there are six s-box implementations, and
seven registers, register pressure means that the s-box invocations are compelled
to be serialized. This was considered by the designers of Dragon as a necessary
security efficiency trade-off.
Guideline 8 (High) Maximize productivity for processor work.
Having chosen a series of efficient operations that provide the cipher with neces-
sary security, make sure that the work performed by processor to execute those
operations is not wasted. The most obvious way to ensure this is to output
keystream in blocks that are multiples of the word size used by the cipher’s
internal state. HC-256, Py, RC4, and MIR-1 all output keystream blocks that
are same size as an internal state word. Dragon has a 32-bit internal state word,
and outputs 64-bit words. These all represent good usage of the work performed
by the processor. Conversely, MAG outputs a block one-quarter the size of the
internal state word, which wastes much of the work performed by the processor.
5.3 Branch Prediction
Some ciphers use branching as an intrinsic part of the algorithm. For example,
MAG’s concise update function contains just four assignments, including one
based upon the result of an inequality comparison (that is, a branch).
The Intel Pentium 4 has a branch prediction unit that analyzes the antici-
pated path of the branch, executes it, and prepares the result by the time the
branch expression is evaluated. When the branch is mis-predicted, the results are
discarded and many cycles of CPU time are wasted, depending upon the size of
the execution pipeline. The Pentium 4 has an exceptionally large pipeline, with
as many as 31 stages, compared to the ten stages of the Pentium III. Thus a
branch mis-prediction will have much worse consequences on the former. Unfor-
tunately, the branch prediction algorithms of the Pentium 4 perform badly with
random data, causing a delay of up between 24 and one hundred cycles with
each mis-prediction. This situation is worse than if the Pentium 4 contained no
branch prediction at all [7].
Guideline 9 (Medium) Avoid branching within the cipher algorithm.
Branch mis-prediction plays a major role in the poor performance of MAG.
Yet RC4, to which MAG is most closely compared by the latter’s designer,
contains no branching of this type. The small size of MAG’s update function
means that the CPU has no chance to recover from the mis-prediction penalties.
This is one reason as to why, despite the similar number of operations, MAG
is four times slower than RC4. If branches can not be omitted, in some cases
the pipeline penalties can be avoided by careful coding (for example, using the
CMOV or SETcc instructions).
6 Instruction Extensions
The MMX and SSE extensions have potential as a valuable avenue for cipher
implementors. The MMX extensions offer 47 new instructions on eight 64-bit
registers. The SSE2/SSE3 instructions bring a wide range of integer and floating
point operations to a set of eight 128-bit XMM registers. Many of the instructions
are variations based around the size of the operands, which can have widths of
8, 16, 32, 64, or (for SSE) 128 bits. The primary benefit of MMX/SSE, aside
from the additional registers, is that one instruction processes multiple operands
in parallel.
The new instruction sets are somewhat deficient, and not particularly effi-
cient. The SSE instructions have typical throughputs and latencies of two cycles.
This puts them on an even footing with the fast integer operations on general
purpose registers, which operate on 32-bits and execute in half a cycle.
Most valuable to cryptographers are the instructions for parallel execution
of simple arithmetic and logical operations, and for a faster multiplication. The
MMX and SSE instructions cannot address memory, which poses problems with
s-boxes. S-boxes can be implemented on the general purpose registers, and in-
dexed using operands computed using MMX/SSE. There is a strong penalty of
six cycles for transferring data between the XMM registers and general purpose
memory, making it problematic to implement any cipher containing s-boxes using
MMX/SSE. Also the MMX and SSE instruction sets lack branching instructions,
which can be simulated at a price on the general purpose registers.
Guideline 10 (Medium) Do not assume that there is a significant advantage
in using MMX or SSE instruction extensions.
In particular, stream ciphers based on small functions that incorporate s-
boxes, or other indirect addressing mechanisms, are probably not amenable for
implementation using MMX or SSE. Some of the ECRYPT ciphers that are not
suitable for efficient implementation using these extensions include Dragon, Py
and HC-256.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In symmetric cipher design, security is paramount and efficiency is a secondary
consideration. However, it is an area in which there are now many successful
candidates, fulfilling both security and efficiency requirements. The ciphers are
judged now, on the platforms that we have available. A cipher designer who
does not understand at a high-level, the architecture of the target machine,
should expect sub-optimal performance from the cipher. This results in a non-
competitive cipher.
The performance of some sub-optimized stream ciphers is shown in Table 1,
for varying payload lengths. The metrics are gathered from an Intel Pentium 4
(Northwood) processor, running at 2.6 GHz, with an 8 kilobyte L1 data cache.
For each test, one gigabyte of data is encrypted. When the specified payload
has been encrypted, IV rekeying occurs. This overhead is incorporated into the
metric, which is expressed as megabits per second. Py-x represents Py with a
rolling array x× the state size of Py implemented using traditional techniques.
Table 1. Performance of Modern Stream Ciphers on the Intel Pentium 4 (Northwood)
Cipher Features
Payload (bytes)
Word Size Internal State 100 1,000 10,000 109
(bits) (bits) Throughput (mbits/s)
Dragon 32 1,088 large s-boxes 407 708 1,028 1,380
HC-256 32 65,536 very large tables 7 66 414 1,372
MAG 32 4,096 frequent branching < 1 7 43 163
MIR-1 64 768 64-bit multiplication 198 362 419 464
Py-1 32 1,560 no rolling array 59 258 491 602
Py-4 32 6,240 large state 68 270 443 797
Py-16 32 24,960 very large state 65 256 446 801
RC4 8 2,048 small and fast 244 488 622 729
Those ciphers that most closely adhere to the guidelines issued in this paper
— Py, Dragon, and HC256 – are the fastest on the Intel Pentium 4. The metrics
of all the ciphers shown degrade with frequent rekeying, but those worst affected
are those that rekey by updating each element in a large state (such as HC-
256), or by excessively updating each element (for example, MAG, which during
rekeying discards 214 bytes of keystream, for each 100-byte payload). These
metrics imply that designers need to pay attention to the key agility of their
ciphers. They also suggest that the rolling arrays of Py lose their advantage on
architectures with small cache sizes, such as the Intel Pentium 4.
This paper does not suggest that ciphers should be designed exclusively for
the Intel Pentium 4. Most of the guidelines should be considered irrespective
of the targeted architecture. All that is required to implement the guidelines
is some knowledge about computer architectures, including the register set; the
memory layout including the size and speed of the caches; the types, throughputs
and latencies of available instructions; and special features of the architecture,
such as SSE2.
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